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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The concept of transnationalism is characterised by an important 
contradiction. While it makes an important contribution to the literature on identity by 
focussing on the themes of hybridity and pluralism, when it discusses the issue of 
transnational capital, it falls into the trap of essentialising ethnicity. Transnational 
theorist argue that there exists a pan-ethnic unity among the Chinese diaspora that 
would enable this community to emerge as a new economic force globally. The case 
studies in this essay reveal, however, that transnational networks do not influence the 
way ethnic groups do business with co-ethnics in other countries. This study  argues 
that there is significant competition among Chinese-owned enterprises, which 
explains the dynamism of these firms. There is also much evidence of inter-ethnic 
corporate ties involving Chinese firms. These findings bring into question the 
importance of common ethnic identity in transnational business transactions 
undertaken by the Chinese companies.   
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Contextualizing the Problem: Promoting Investments in China 
 
In the early 1990s, the role of “networks” in the development of enterprises 
owned by ethnic Chinese became a major topic of interest. Academic and popular 
studies began actively claiming that ethnic Chinese around the world were working 
through ethnically-based networks to channel huge investments into China. Terms 
such as “Chinese commonwealth”1 and “global tribe”2 were created to describe this 
alleged “network of entrepreneurial relationships”3 by individual firms that shared “a 
common culture”.4
 
This idea about extensive business networks among ethnic Chinese is also 
attributable to well-publicised statements by Southeast Asian leaders. For reasons of 
their own, from the early 1990s, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir 
Mohamad began encouraging ethnic Chinese in their countries to use their “ancestral” 
identity to exploit the economic opportunities that had reputedly opened up in China. 
Meanwhile, in China, authorities at all levels had been flaunting ethnic ties in an 
attempt to draw diasporic investment. In response, Chinese business people in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia took advantage of the privileges on offer to start 
new enterprises in the mainland. The encouragement and privileges accorded by the 
government of China to “Overseas Chinese” – as the Chinese authorities view them – 
had the support of government leaders in Singapore and Malaysia.  
  
Lee, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, has been a particularly strong 
advocate of Chinese business networking, especially within Asia. Chinese-owned 
businesses have been encouraged by Lee to recognise that ethnic networking is an 
effective way to move into potentially lucrative markets in China, to compete more 
effectively with multinational corporations and to transform the handicap they may 
feel as ethnic minorities into an advantage, not just in the region, but in the global 
economy.  
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Malaysia’s ex-Prime Minister, Mahathir, on the other hand, urged indigenous 
Bumiputera5 businessmen to work with Chinese entrepreneurs to enter the market in 
China partly as a means to promote the development of Malay capital. In 1993, 
Mahathir led an almost 300-strong delegation to China, with half his entourage 
comprising businessmen, in an attempt to expose the latter to the mainland. Similarly, 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, within six months of being appointed Prime Minister in 
November 2003, made two official visits to China to encourage Malaysian companies 
to tap into the rapidly burgeoning Chinese market. In his second trip, in May 2004, 
Abdullah had more than 500 businessmen in his entourage. Abdullah even went so far 
as to identify the economic sectors that these Malaysian businessmen could venture 
into in China – education, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, health care, tourism and 
high technology.6
  
These endeavours by government leaders in China, Singapore and Malaysia 
suggest that the growth of ethnic Chinese investment in the mainland is due less to a 
modern form of tribalism than to state policies (at both ends of the investment flow). 
This also suggests that the notion of a proliferation of powerful networks comprising 
Chinese capitalists is dubious. A network with the economic clout of a “global tribe” 
would need interlocking stock-ownership ties, a sharing of resources and cooperation 
to the point of merger. Some successful Chinese capitalists avoid not just mergers but 
any collective endeavour, including participation in Chinese Chambers of Commerce. 
  
The proliferation of world conventions of Chinese dialect and clan 
associations in the last twenty years has, however, been cited by some observers as 
clinching proof that ethnic Chinese are pouring funds into China and that they use 
their common identity and affective bonds to do business. Deals among a handful of 
major Chinese capitalists have been used to back the theory that, in an increasingly 
globalised business environment, ethnic Chinese are creating transnational business 
networks. The corporate activities of an elite Chinese – Malaysia’s Robert Kuok and 
Khoo Kay Peng, Indonesia’s Liem Sioe Leong, Singapore’s Ong Beng Seng, the 
Philippine’s Henry Sy and John Gokongwei, Thailand’s Sophonpanich family and 
Charoen Pokphand group and Hong Kong’s Li Ka Shing and Lee Shau Kee – have 
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been the primary basis for arguing that there exists growing business cooperation in 
Asia among Chinese enterprises which will ensure their emergence as a dynamic 
global business force.7   
 
The extent to which these Chinese associations really do represent increasing 
economic integration across frontiers remains to be researched, but there is more 
probably a political explanation for their emergence. State authorities in China and 
Taiwan encourage them. Ethnic Chinese take advantage of the privileges on offer to 
trade and manufacture, with the blessing of the governments in Singapore and 
Malaysia, and join associations that promote such activities.  
  
However, more recently, a growing literature on Chinese transnationalism 
stresses that common ethnic identity promotes new business ventures in China by 
ethnic Chinese from other parts of Asia. This literature argues that Chinese business 
organisations share a common characteristic of crucial reliance on business networks 
in coordinating production and distribution of products and services. This has 
prompted some scholars to proclaim networks to be a unique institutional feature of 
“Chinese capitalism”, a system that is distinctive from the western notion of 
bureaucratisation and efficiency. This study involves an assessment of transnational 
theory through an in-depth analysis of investments in China by ethnic Chinese-owned 
Malaysian firms. The research here will also appraise the pattern of enterprise 
development by the Malaysian firms in China.  
 
 
The Problem with Transnationalism: Reviewing the Literature 
 
Guarnizo and Smith identify four key issues that define transnational theory.9 
First, the rise and influence of globalisation. Second, technological development, 
specifically in the areas of transportation and communication. Third, political changes 
within society, arising from decolonisation or the universalisation of human rights. 
Fourth, the development of social networks, which aid cross-border migration and 
economic or business trade. 
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A transnational community is a social formation best exemplified by ethnic 
diasporas. It relates in the manner of a triad to its globally dispersed self, the states it 
inhabits and its ancestral homeland.10 Its medium is the network, dynamised by new 
technologies. Multiple identifications and a sense of cultural fluidity, represented as 
creolised or hybrid, mark its “consciousness”. Economic transnationalism is chiefly 
the province of global corporations, but ethnic groups are also players in the world 
economy, by virtue of their remittances to and investments in the homelands. 
Governments, realising the worth of this inward flow, play on the ethnic loyalty of 
“nationals” abroad to gain access to their capital. Economic resources flow through 
diasporic networks as well as to the homeland. As technology speeds the globalisation 
of politics, diasporas become politically more vocal, at both ends of the migration 
process. 
 
Researchers claim that the networks that typify transnational communities 
work at the level of the diaspora as a whole as well as in its separate “homelands” 
(ancestral and adopted), and that new technologies connect the triad “with increasing 
speed and efficiency”.12 Many studies assume that institutionalised ethnic networks 
permit diasporic co-ethnics to move capital across national boundaries. Some 
examples, as noted above, can be found in the triumphalist discourses of Chinese 
capitalism, which argue that the creation of intra-ethnic business networks based on a 
sense of group cohesion facilitates the movement of funds across borders and the 
mutually beneficial pooling of resources in enterprise development.13
 
This body of transnational literature argues that contemporary Chinese 
capitalism has distinctive characteristics that have facilitated its growth. Chinese 
culture and value systems determine decision-making among firms owned by business 
people from this community, while intra-ethnic networks, based on trust and kinship 
ties, help reduce transaction costs and diminish risks.14 These business networks are 
tightly-knit, based on strong ethnic and solidaristic dimensions. A major problem with 
many of these studies is that the Chinese are treated as a homogenous and monolithic 
group.  
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Other interpretations of the term “transnationalism” draw attention to the 
complexity of the concept of migrant “belonging”. Basch, Schiller and Blanc, for 
example, writing about Caribbean and Filipino migrants to the United States, argue 
that the term “transnationalism” as previously employed by social scientists lacked 
specificity and failed to recognise that immigrant groups develop ideologies, lifestyles 
and networks that span homeland and host society.15 Defining transnationalism as 
“the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations 
that link together their societies of origin and settlement”, they assert that immigrants 
tend to “develop and maintain multiple relationships – familial, economic, social, 
organizational, religious and political – that span borders”.16 Basch, Schiller and 
Blanc focus on the rights of individuals within nation states in an age of growing 
cross-border movement by corporations and people, though the stress of their study is 
on migrant communities rather than long-settled communities with several 
generations of descendants. 
  
On the issue of capital and transnationalism, Miyoshi drew attention to the 
evolution of “multinational” corporations (MNCs) into “transnational” corporations 
(TNCs), which are able through their web of investment networks in numerous 
countries to shift their operations across national borders.17 In drawing the distinction, 
Miyoshi argued that a TNC, unlike an MNC, “might no longer be tied to its nation of 
origin but is adrift and mobile, ready to settle anywhere and to exploit any state 
including its own, as long as the affiliation serves its own interests”.18 Castells, on the 
other hand, noted that MNCs “down-size” by out-sourcing jobs as a way of lowering 
production costs.19 This process of out-sourcing has led to the development of 
“network enterprise” in which a densely interlocking group of firms engage in a range 
of industries and operate in a number of different countries.  
  
Castells’ formulation of “networks” is similar to Gereffi’s concept of “global 
commodity chains” in which production networks connect different companies.20 
These networks are created to cut costs, improve quality of goods and enhance 
innovation. Castells places greater emphasis on the impact of new technologies and 
the rise of the “informational society” as a driving force behind the development of 
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these networks. In the case of Chinese firms, Castells advances a relatively nuanced 
argument, i.e. that most such enterprises are family-owned and that the production ties 
they engender are highly personalised, fluid and changeable.21 However, Castells 
exaggerates the extent to which companies owned by family members are represented 
in such networks. In reality, most of them include firms owned by people outside the 
family circle.  
  
This tripartite link between transnationalism, capital and identity has been 
most lucidly developed in Ong and Nonini’s volume Ungrounded Empires: The 
Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism.22 Among Chinese migrants, 
Ong and Nonini argue during the transnational experience, migrants develop a “third 
culture”, one defined as a “modern Chinese transnationalism” that “provides 
alternative visions in late capitalism to Western modernity and generates new and 
distinctive social arrangements, cultural discourses, practices and subjectivities.”23 
This third culture would include the deployment of economic strategies, such as the 
family firm and guanxi relations or networks, to accumulate capital.24
  
Ong and Nonini point to the strength of the state in Asia and its capacity to 
control “globalisation”, and rightly maintain that much of the “new capitalism of the 
Asia-Pacific is state-driven and state-sponsored”.25 However, their argument that 
“modern Chinese transnationalism is expanding ever more rapidly across the Asia 
Pacific and indeed launching the capitalist development of China itself” is 
disappointing.26 While Chinese-owned firms from East and Southeast Asia have 
invested in China, it is doubtful that they have driven the mainland’s economic 
expansion over the past decade.  
  
Some of Ong and Nonini’s other contentions are likewise questionable. These 
include their assertion that “Chinese transnational capitalists act out flexible strategies 
of accumulation in networks that cut across political borders and are linked through 
second-tier global cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou (Canton), Hong Kong, Taipei, 
Singapore, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. These overlapping business, social and 
kinship networks stitch together dynamic, productive, financial and marketing regions 
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that are not contained by a single-nation or subject to its influence.”27 At another 
point, they suggest “diasporic capitalist interests can subvert state disciplining by 
transferring economic capital out of their host countries to overseas locations, and 
thus act to transform national economies under the rubric of ‘market forces’”.28 On 
the one hand, they exaggerate the role played by Chinese-owned capital in driving the 
economic boom in East Asia; on the other hand, they minimise the capacity of the 
state to discipline Chinese capitalists and exaggerate the capitalists’ ability to transfer 
their assets across borders. Their suggestion that Chinese capitalists in the region act 
as a cohesive unit by means of tightly-knit intra-ethnic “networks” that enable them to 
emerge as a dynamo for economic growth in Asia is wrong in two respects. By 
creating a tripartite linkage of transnationalism, identity and capitalism, it tends both 
to essentialise patterns of enterprise development among Chinese and to homogenise 
ethnic communities of the diaspora.  
  
In this type of theorising about this tripartite linkage in transnational settings, 
these theorists have served to “essentialise capitalism” and intra-ethnic business 
networks. Redding and Hamilton,29 though not writing within the perspective of 
transnational theory, have been the most vocal proponents of the growing 
transnational impact of Chinese businesses and networks. This essentialising of 
Chinese-owned enterprises has been further developed in the literature on ethnic 
enterprise, specifically through the works of Light and Waldinger.29 This 
homogenising of ethnic communities and culture is very similar to arguments 
propagated through concepts like “global tribes”, “bamboo networks” and “Chinese 
commonwealth”. 
  
This idea that the cultural traits of ethnic Chinese of the diaspora are, in 
essence, the same feeds the argument that this community’s businesses display an 
“ethnic style” characterised by family firms and intra-ethnic business networks. The 
“family firm” and intra-ethnic national and transnational connections (or guanxi) and 
networks play a crucial role in capital formation and accumulation. These two modes 
of business and social organisation, that is family firms and intra-ethnic networks, are 
also central to the “Confucian ethic”, a perennial theme of those analysts who believe 
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that culture matters, to the point of using it as the key explanatory tool when analysing 
Chinese enterprise. 
  
Most scholars concur that family and kinship ties are key constituents of 
Chinese enterprise.30 Kinship ties were an important consideration in hiring staff and 
acquiring funds to get enterprises going in the early days. At the point of creation of a 
firm, control of the company frequently is in the hands of the founder and key family 
members, but this trait is not unique to the Chinese.31
  
The term “networks” is more contentious. Redding, for example, asserts that 
Chinese networks in Taiwan and Hong Kong share commonalities that indicate 
“cultural predispositions, most of which are traceable to Confucian values”.32 
Researchers subscribing to this view argue that Chinese enterprise is a form of 
“network capitalism” or “guanxi capitalism”.33 This form of capitalism reputedly 
provides Chinese firms in Southeast Asia with ample competitive advantages.34
  
Others go further, to the extent of talking about “Chinese diaspora capitalism”. 
Lever-Tracy and Tracy argue that this form of capitalism is based on personalised, 
long-term horizontal networks that bind together Chinese-owned family companies.35 
Such networks are “embedded in relations of reciprocity” and rest on the principle of 
trust. This type of capitalism is said to pre-date “modern capitalism” and to attach less 
weight than other forms of capitalism to corporate expansion and profit 
maximisation.36
  
Few researchers opposed to this cultural perspective would deny the existence 
of “networks” created by Chinese-owned enterprises. Their main criticism concerns 
not networks as such but the problematic notion of “Chineseness”, which they believe 
plays only a minor role in determining how Chinese business people make decisions 
and develop their enterprises.37 In their view, analyses based on culture misrepresent 
the basis for and extent of business ties among Chinese firms. Networks are not 
formed in a single dimension but are primarily production chains or sub-contracting 
ties that undergo processes of change and operate at multiple levels. Co-ethnic 
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cooperation for the benefit of the community is not the reason for the creation of these 
business ties.38
  
The historical profile of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia suggests that 
common definitions of transnationalism, involving its triad nature, are applicable only 
to migrants, although there is growing evidence that even this assertion can be 
challenged.39 Even the identities of some longer-settled members of the migrant 
cohort undergo a profound reconfiguration, with the adoption a different 
understanding of national identity and allegiance. This is reflected in the rising 
number of cases of ethnic minorities seeking and securing political office in Australia, 
Canada, the US and the UK.40 The Southeast Asian case provides an interesting study 
of the complexity of the issue of ethnic and national identity, as it indicates how 
identity evolves over time, how its reconfigurations are conditioned by political and 
economic changes and how the sense of cohesion of the migrant generation dies 
away.  
  
This suggests that the normative definition of transnationalism fails to capture 
the identity transformations that occur as diasporic generations deepen. Definitions of 
transnationalism tend to repeat old discourses of fixed origins assumed to bind 
diasporic communities into cohesive wholes. Writings on the subject extrapolate from 
the experience of the migrant cohort to the group as a whole, fail to incorporate the 
experience either of the migrants who strike roots or, more importantly, of the locally 
born generations, neglect differences of class and sub-ethnic affiliation and generally 
exaggerate the coherence of ethnic groups. 
  
If we adopt this perspective, we could argue that the literature on the concept 
of transnationalism is characterised by an important contradiction. While, on one 
hand, transnationalism makes an important contribution to the literature on identity by 
focussing on the themes of hybridity and pluralism, on the other hand, when it 
attempts to move into the domain of transnational capitalism, it falls into the trap of 
essentialising ethnicity. The fundamental problem in much of the literature on 
transnationalism is the liberal and unquestioning use of the term “networks”. These 
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studies suggest that ethnically-based “networks” are institutionalised and play a 
significant role in helping co-ethnics around the world to mobilise and move capital 
across national boundaries. When the concept of transnationalism shifts from the 
domain of politics, human rights and the creation of an inclusive nation state and 
delves into the domain of capitalism, it runs into dangerous grounds. Undoubtedly, 
minority ethnic groups, particularly those born in their country of domicile, stress the 
issue of multiplicity of identities and object to the questioning of their loyalty to the 
nation state by the dominant majority population. But to argue that the dynamism and 
development of Chinese enterprises in Asia are due primarily to inter-ethnic business 
networks that have been forged to act against, among other things an oppressive 
nation state, serves only to reinforce ideas about a form of ethnic cohesiveness in the 
economic domain that does not exist. Chinese capitalism apparently thrives because 
intra-ethnically based networks are rooted in a cohesiveness that allows them to easily 
move funds across borders for the benefit of the community. 
  
Since they deal mostly with migration, transnational studies inevitably tend to 
focus on migrants who retain homeland ties. They also focus on people with the 
resources to migrate, a preoccupation perhaps inevitable in an age of transnational 
flows of capital and a burgeoning literature on the Chinese networks through which 
such funds are said to flow across borders. This selective focus is a major 
shortcoming of transnational studies. By conceptualising migration and networks so 
narrowly, they create a false impression of how migrants view themselves in relation 
to other Chinese in the world and of how they develop their enterprise in local and 
foreign economies. Most studies on Chinese migration and enterprise development 
written from a transnational perspective fail to explore the implications of their 
generalisations for Chinese who do not cross borders, or for those born in their 
migrant parents’ adopted country.42 We would even question the extent of mobility 
not only of the offspring but even of the pioneers. The “myth of return” is by now a 
cliché of migration studies, for migrants talk of home but rarely return, given their 
investment of capital and emotion overseas and their children’s lack of ties to the 
ancestral homeland.  
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Research Methodology 
 
This review of the literature on the concept of transnationalism would point to 
two fundamental problems with how this concept is deployed. The first problem is the 
liberal and unquestioning use of the term “networks”. In effect, these studies suggest 
that ethnically-based “networks” are institutionalised and play a fundamental role in 
helping co-ethnics of the diaspora mobilise and move capital across national 
boundaries.  
  
The second problem is that the concept of transnationalism draws little 
attention to the diversity in the forms of corporate development of Chinese business 
groups when they cross borders. There are conspicuous differences in the way ethnic 
Chinese from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore develop their 
enterprises. In Malaysia, a study of the largest enterprises indicates that Chinese 
capitalists have used diverse methods to develop their firms. The different attitudes by 
these investors to manner of corporate growth appear to be a factor that hinders co-
ethnic collaborative business ventures. Consequently, the potential influence of 
Chinese capital coalescing and emerging as a major force in the global economy is 
improbable. In view of the diversity of business styles of ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs, it is a gross distortion to tar all Chinese-owned enterprises with the 
same brush; put differently, the argument that there exists a particular type of  
“Chinese capitalism” can be challenged. 
  
The research methodology adopted here to substantiate this contention of 
the problems with transnational theory is through an assessment of Malaysian 
Chinese investments in China. The research will determine if these cross-border 
investments are promoted through ethnically-based networks. Networks are 
defined here as interlocking stock ownership ties, interlocking directorates and 
cooperation to the point of merger. The study will also focus on the form and 
extent of intra-ethnic business ties between ethnic Chinese from Malaysia and 
other Chinese in Asia or in China.  
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 By determining why Malaysian enterprises invest in China, we can determine 
if common ethnic identity serves as an important means to develop new enterprises in 
the mainland. As assessment of the outcome of Malaysian investments in China will 
provide insights into the following questions: Are there ties among Malaysian 
Chinese firms that aid their attempt to build new enterprises in China? Are Malaysian 
Chinese establishing joint-ventures or forging links with other ethnic Chinese from 
Asia when setting up new enterprises in China? Do Malaysian Chinese cultivate 
corporate ties with business people in China to help them develop their enterprises? 
Have investments by Malaysian Chinese in China contributed significantly to the 
growth of their firms? Is there a distinct type of “Chinese capitalism” which helps 
members of this community develop their firms? 
 
 
Malaysian Business in China 
 
In 2003, Malaysian firms were listed as the 15th largest investor in China. In 
2002, the volume of Malaysian foreign direct investments (FDI) in China amounted to 
RM306 billion (or about US$76.5 billion), with the mainland listed as among the top 
10 FDI destinations of Malaysian investors; this figure was then widely accepted to 
increase.45 There have undoubtedly been numerous investments in China by some of 
Malaysia’s leading publicly-listed enterprises, including well-diversified firms owned 
by the country’s leading capitalists including Robert Kuok (Perlis Plantations group), 
Quek Leng Chan (Hong Leong group), William Cheng (Lion group), Vincent Tan 
(Berjaya group), Khoo Kay Peng (MUI group) and Francis Yeoh (YTL Corp group).  
 
A number of smaller quoted firms, in terms of market capitalisation, have also 
invested in China. These companies include Apollo Food (manufacturer and trader of 
chocolate confectionery products), Mamee Double Decker (owned by the Pang family 
and a manufacturer of instant noodles which established a new plant in Suzchou in 
1998), Kim Hin Industry (owned by the Chua family and a manufacturer of ceramic 
tiles), Leader Universal Holdings (owned by Hng Bok San, and a manufacturer and 
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distributor of a variety of electrical and telecommunication cables), New Hong Fatt 
Holdings (owned by Kam Leng Fatt and his partners and involved in the 
manufacturing and marketing of automotive spare parts and accessories), AKN 
Technology (owned by Tan Yeow Teck and his partners and involved in metal 
stamping and precision tool manufacturing), PCCS Group (manufacturer and 
distributor of golf apparels), Ramatek (manufacturer of textile and garment products), 
Prolexus (a garment manufacturer which has a joint venture in China), Integrated 
Logistics (involved in logistics and a bonded warehouse operator), Thong Guan 
Industries (manufacturer of plastic garbage bags), JSPC i-Solutions (involved in IT 
business applications) and Globetronics Technology (integrated circuit contract 
manufacturer). 
  
The primary activity of these large and medium-sized firms is manufacturing, 
for domestic consumption in China and export. This suggests that their decision to 
invest in China may primarily have been in response to structural problems within the 
Malaysian economy. In one study undertaken by a private consultancy, the labour 
costs in the lower end of product manufacturing are significantly cheaper in China 
compared to Malaysia. This factor alone has been used by Malaysian businesses to 
justify the transfer of their manufacturing activities to China. This study by the 
consultancy, Deloitte KassimChan Business Services, of the activities of about 160 – 
primarily manufacturing – firms also revealed that these enterprises encountered a 
host of problems following their decision to invest in China. More than half of these 
respondents – about 53 per cent – admitted that their enterprises in China were still 
not profitable but they would continue to invest in the hope of securing better returns 
in the future. Corruption involving government officials that they had to deal with was 
cited as another problem by about 73 per cent of these Malaysian businessmen. 
Another key problem they faced was keen competition, from Malaysian as well as 
other foreign firms operating in the mainland. Labour problems, in terms of securing a 
reliable and loyal managerial team, were cited as another serious problem faced by 
Malaysian investors.46
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 Since the cost of manufacturing of products such as electrical and electronic 
goods, chemicals, steel, iron and consumer goods, is significantly cheaper in China, 
Malaysian firms involved is such activities have been compelled to transfer their 
plants to the mainland to ensure that the pricing of their goods remains competitive in 
the global market. In other sectors, like the garment industry, because of WTO 
regulations, companies in this business in Malaysia have no alternative but to move 
abroad. Some firms, like Padini Holdings, once actively involved in the manufacturer 
and distributor of garment products, ceased its manufacturing activities and began 
out-sourcing its orders to firms in China. The company justified this decision on the 
grounds that “price, speed, flexibility and capacity were all considerations that tipped 
the balance in favour of the Chinese”.47 China is the world’s largest apparel and 
footwear producer. 
  
It is probably because production costs of manufacturing are cheaper in China 
the Malaysian government has been actively encouraging domestic firms to invest in 
the mainland. Apart from Prime Minister Abdullah’s two well-publicised visits to 
China, the International Trade & Industry Minister, Rafidah Aziz, has also advocated 
the benefits of investing in the mainland. During a trade mission to China in May 
2004, Rafidah revealed that in Shanghai alone there were 151 projects involving 
Malaysian firms. Most of these investments were in the manufacturing sector, 
involving the production of, among other things, ceramics, vegetable oils and plastic 
material. Among the major Malaysian firms operating in Shanghai include Malayan 
Banking, William Cheng’s Parkson supermarket and Malaysian Airlines.48  
  
However, during my interviews with Malaysian government officials that have 
investigated the outcome of investments by domestic firms in China, it was disclosed 
that many of these companies have not secured the expected returns on their 
investments. Their venture abroad has involved substantial capital investments, for 
example, to establish new plants for their manufacturing activities, and for this reason 
they prefer to remain in China and hope for a turn of luck rather than cut their losses 
and return to Malaysia. The studies by government officials confirmed the arguments 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 7 15
by private sector reports that Malaysian enterprises encounter a variety of problems in 
China, including having to deal with corrupt government officials, securing the 
services of a competent local management team and ensuring the loyalty of a labour 
force. 
 Press reports in Malaysia, however, focus on the “success stories” in China. 
When Malaysian firms record attractive returns on their investments in the mainland, 
this is provided much publicity in the government-controlled media. Among the firms 
that have been highlighted include Integrated Logistics, a company that first ventured 
into China around 1994 and is presently one of the more prominent Malaysian firms 
operating in the mainland. This company has constructed and operates warehouses in 
various parts of China including in Dalian, Tianjin, Suzhou and Guangzhou. In 2004, 
the company announced that two more warehouses would be built in Shenzen and 
Shanghai.49 The company provides warehousing facilities to multi-national firms, and 
the expansion of its activities was primarily attributed to growing FDI investments in 
China.  
  
Another firm that has been expanding its operations in China is Thong Guan 
Industries, which first invested in a manufacturing facility in Suzhou. While the firm’s 
facilities were producing about 500 tonnes of garbage bags for export, primarily to 
Japan, in 2004, the company invested another RM3 million that year to double its 
production capacity. This investment was an attempt to expand its export capacity to 
other parts of Asia. Prior to this new investment, Khong Guan Industries had invested 
about RM20 million in China.50  
 
PCCS group has a wholly-owned subsidiary in the mainland, China Roots 
Packaging Pte Ltd, which operates a one-stop packaging materials outlet. A number 
of unlisted companies, like Merry Brown Fried Chicken, Sugar Bun, Dave’s Deli and 
England Optical have franchising operations in China.51 The large and medium-scale 
Malaysian enterprises that have ventured into China can be classified as highly 
entrepreneurial firms, which have shown a capacity to venture into manufacturing as 
well as develop new products and have been able to identify and effectively exploit 
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niche markets. None of these companies have, however, any interlocking ownership 
ties with other Malaysian firms. Their relationship with each other, by their own 
admission, is one characterised by intense competition, not cooperation. 
  
The following brief review of investments in China by some of Malaysia’s 
largest enterprises provides further insights into the key issues that inform the form of 
development of these enterprises in the mainland. 
 
 
Case Studies 
 
Robert Kuok’s Diversified Interests 
 
One of the most prominent ethnic Chinese business with extensive 
investments in China is Robert Kuok, who is believed to have been investing in the 
country since 1983. Malaysia-born Kuok operates out of Hong Kong through his 
Shangri-La hotel chain and Kerry Trading, which has had joint-ventures with the 
Chinese central government.52
  
The scale of Kuok’s investments in China is not surprising because he has 
long been one of the most active proponents of the potential economic impact of the 
Chinese diaspora in Asia. In 1991, Kuok is quoted as arguing, “because of the sheer 
size of their capital flows, and increasing all the time, they make an enormous impact 
on the economies of the region, particularly as they possess considerable 
entrepreneurial and organizational abilities. By and large, they are a very thrifty lot, 
and very careful with money. Therefore, in a region where capital is in perennial short 
supply and at the same time development schemes are both plentiful as well as crying 
out for action, the Overseas Chinese capitalists are really the best medicine that can be 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 7 17
prescribed because they tend to start a project or an industry with a small money 
investment but with large investments of time, skill and energy.”53   
 
Kuok has, however, probably managed to develop his extensive business 
interests in China because of his close links with the Chinese authorities.  In 1993, he 
was selected as one of the advisors to the Chinese authorities on the future of Hong 
Kong. That year, Kuok was also appointed by China’s government as a director and 
made a shareholder of Citic Pacific, the Hong Kong-listed arm of the Beijing-based 
government agency, China International Trust and Investment Corporation (Citic).54 
To secure foreign investments, particularly from ethnic Chinese from around the 
globe, the mainland government formed Citic. Another prominent director on Citic’s 
board is Hong Kong’s Li Ka Shing. Kuok’s interest in Citic Pacific now amounts to 
about 10 per cent and is held through his companies in Hong Kong.55
  
Kuok’s involvement in hotels through the Shangri-La chain, for which he has 
gained international repute, commenced in the 1970s. When he moved from Malaysia 
to Singapore in 1971, it was to establish the Shangri-La hotel, and his entry into Hong 
Kong was for a similar reason. From this initial venture in Hong Kong, Kuok has 
diversified into electronic and publishing media, property development, 
manufacturing and trading. Through Hong Kong, he has gained entry into China, 
establishing a similar pattern of growth, first establishing a Shangri-La hotel chain, 
then venturing into property development and eventually developing a manufacturing 
base, including a vegetable oil refinery and Coca-Cola bottling plants. In major 
property development schemes in Beijing and Shanghai, Kuok has worked with Li Ka 
Shing, and in Chengdu in Sichuan province, he was involved in developing a huge 
shopping complex with T.T. Tsui, who controls the Hong Kong-listed company, 
China Paint Holdings.56
  
Kuok’s interests in media in East Asia have been growing. In September 1993, 
through his Hong Kong-based Kerry Group, Kuok acquired a 35 per cent stake in the 
South China Morning Post Holdings, which publishes Hong Kong’s leading English-
language newspaper, the South China Morning Post. This newspaper publishing 
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company was acquired from News Corp, owned by the Australian media magnate 
Rupert Murdoch. The South China Morning Post owns a 15 per cent stake in 
Thailand’s Post Publishing Company, which owns the influential Thai daily, the 
Bangkok Post. Kuok also owns 32 per cent of Television Broadcasts (TVB), Hong 
Kong’s leading television station. Following Kuok’s move into the media sector, in 
which he had no previous experience, one regional magazine reported that, “Some 
analysts speculate that Peking blessed – if not bankrolled – Kuok’s purchase of SCMP 
(South China Morning Post)”.57 This was seen as an attempt to channel ownership and 
control of the influential newspaper into the hands of businessmen associated with the 
Chinese authorities.   
  
Kuok is probably the best example of an ethnic Chinese businessman who has 
created joint ownership ties or business deals with a number of Asia’s leading 
Chinese capitalists. There is evidence that Kuok has been involved with Indonesia’s 
Liem through his sugar business and in property development ventures in China with 
Hong Kong’s Li Ka Shing and T.T. Tsui.  With Run Run Shaw, Kuok has a joint 
interest in Hong Kong’s TVB. Kuok has had some business deals with Thailand’s 
Chatri Sophonpanich, another of Southeast Asia’s leading Chinese capitalists who 
controls Bangkok Bank that, according to Asiaweek,58 was one of “Kuok’s initial 
bankrollers.” In Malaysia, Kuok has worked closely with Malayan United Industries 
(MUI) Khoo Kay Peng – they jointly hold equity in South China Morning Post 
Holdings – and the major property developer Tan Chin Nam who controls IGB 
Corporation, IJM Corporation and Tan & Tan Development.59 Kuok and Tan share a 
long-standing friendship but there is no evidence that the enterprises they own are 
jointly involved in any business deals in China. 
  
While Kuok’s links with businessmen in Malaysia and Hong Kong would 
suggest that business networks exist, he is probably the exception to the rule. Kuok’s 
development of his business ventures in China has been widely attributed to his close 
ties with leaders of the Chinese state, not just his entrepreneurial efforts. Even though 
some of these enterprises involve other ethnic Chinese, almost all analysts of his 
business operations refer to them as “family-controlled”, dominated by Kuok. 
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William Cheng’s Lion Group 
 
William Cheng Heng Jem, through his main Malaysian publicly-listed 
flagship, Lion Corporation, has control over a number of other quoted companies.  
The Lion group first started investing in China in 1992, and by 1995, it was estimated 
that the company had invested almost RM400 million in the country. The volume of 
his investments in the mainland reportedly made Cheng the second largest Malaysian 
investor in China after Kuok.60 Cheng is also the president of the Malaysian Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce. 
  
In China, his most prominent business ventures are in beer brewing – Hubei 
Lion Brewery (60 per cent equity), Hubei Jinlongquan Brewery Co Ltd (60 per cent), 
Hunan Lion Brewery Co Ltd (55 per cent), Ningbo Lion Brewery Co Ltd (55 per 
cent) and Zhuzhou Lian Brewery Co Ltd (55 per cent) – motorcycle and tyre 
manufacturing – Changchun Motorbike Co Ltd, Changchun Motorbike and Engine 
Co Ltd and Dong Feng Lion Tyre Co Ltd – the operation of nearly 40 Parkson 
departmental stores and the manufacturing of chocolates through Beijing Vochelle 
Foodstuff Co Ltd. 
  
The Lion group has been described as being “over-diversified”, with the 
suggestion that it has lost its focus. This heavy diversification was probably one 
reason why Cheng faced enormous problems after the onset of the 1997 currency 
crisis, which also revealed that his firms were heavily laden with debts that they had 
problems servicing. His ventures in China were reportedly registering huge losses, 
exacerbating Cheng’s financial predicament. The Lion group was subsequently 
restructured, involving primarily a massive divestment of assets and firms to reduce 
its debt burden. In China, the group’s main ventures presently are the Parkson 
retailing outlets and the manufacturing of beer and motorcycles, through the 
contribution of these activities to the group’s profit margin is reportedly not 
impressive. For this reason, the group’s beer manufacturing operations may also be 
divested.61
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Cheng, however, continues to maintain that China remains an important 
source of revenue for him in the long-term, even going so far as to lament that, ‘I 
should have gone to China much earlier. Just look at Robert Kuok… he went in much 
earlier and has big investments there. The returns on investments are better’. And his 
solution to his group’s problems in China would be resolved by focussing on core 
activities: ‘We are consolidating our investments in China, to focus on a few of the 
core industries that we are currently among the top players. In order to be successful 
in China, you need to be either No. 1 or 2’.62
  
Cheng’s business deals provide no evidence of cooperative ties with either 
other Chinese from Malaysia or elsewhere. He received no support from the 
governments in China or Malaysia that had encouraged businessmen like him to 
invest in the mainland. Although some of his ventures have been joint-ventures, a few 
involving domestic enterprises in China, in his interviews, Cheng does not talk about 
involving other firms or ethnic Chinese business people in his present ventures to lift 
the prospects of his group. Despite registering poor returns from his investments in 
China, his solution is to hold on to key investments while reducing his involvement in 
a number of other activities. In this regard, his manner of dealing with his problems in 
China is no different from other Malaysian investors who have not been performing 
well in the mainland. 
 
 
Quek Leng Chan’s Hong Leong 
 
Hong Leong group’s listed subsidiary, OYL Industries, which manufactures 
air-conditioners and air-filters, is one firm that has managed to register respectable 
returns from its investments in China. OYL Industries first ventured into China in 
1994 when it set up a new plant to manufacturer air-conditioners. By 2004, the firm 
had three manufacturing plants in China, in Wuhan, Shenzen and Suzhou. 
Subsequently, another of Hong Leong’s quoted firms, Malaysian Pacific Industries, 
invested in a factory to produce semi-conductors in Suzhou. Guoco Group, a member 
of the Hong Leong group that is publicly-listed in Hong Kong, has investments in 
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property development projects in Beijing and Shanghai. Hong Leong’s investments in 
China had not been very lucrative until OYL Industries began to register profits, 
precipitating a new round of investments by the group.63 The Hong Leong group’s 
partner in the manufacturing of air-conditioners is the American firm, AAF-McQuay. 
  
Hong Leong has also been developing a major interest in banking, in Malaysia 
and Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, Hong Leong joined forces with the Kuwait 
Investment Office (KIO) to acquire the Dao Heng Bank in 1987. In 1989, Hong 
Leong secured a controlling interest in another bank in Hong Kong, Hang Lung Bank, 
which was merged with the Dao Heng Bank; this gave the Hong Leong group the fifth 
largest bank network in the territory. In 1992, the group bought another bank in Hong 
Kong, the Overseas Trust Bank.64 In 2004, however, the Hong Leong group divested 
its interests in the Dao Heng Bank to Singapore’s DBS Bank for a massive RM10 
billion.65
  
Hong Leong group has a history of takeover of firms owned by other 
Chinese, obvious in the banking sector with its takeover of Hang Lung Bank and 
Overseas Trust Bank in Hong Kong. In Malaysia, Hong Leong bought MUI 
Bank, later renamed, Hong Leong Bank. MUI Bank was owned by Quek’s long-
time adversary, though one time close ally, Khoo Kay Peng. In Singapore, he was 
involved in a takeover bid of the prominent food and drink manufacturer, Yeo 
Hap Seng. Hong Leong is known to have cultivated business ties with non-
Chinese firms, for example, in its venture to develop the production of air-
conditioners, now one of its most thriving enterprises. There is little evidence 
that Quek has worked with other Chinese in any of his ventures in China. 
 
 
Francis Yeoh’s YTL Corp 
 
The YTL Corp group, controlled by Francis Yeoh, is primarily involved in 
construction, power generation and the manufacture of cement. YTL Corp gained a 
strong reputation in construction and cement manufacturing before diversifying into 
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power generation when it was awarded an independent power producer (IPP) licence 
by the Malaysian government in 1992. Yeoh was reputed to have a close relationship 
with then Prime Minister, Mahathir. The group quickly acquired expertise in this 
sector by cooperating with Siemens AG of Germany, before embarking abroad on its 
own. YTL Corp subsequently secured power generation contracts in Singapore, 
Thailand and Zimbabwe. 
  
YTL Corp’s venture into China involved the securing of a contract to supply 
electricity in 1997.66 In October 1996, YTL Corp had tried unsuccessfully to take over 
80 per cent of Consolidated Electric Power Asia (CEPA), the power supply subsidiary 
of the Hong Kong-based Hopewell Holdings, controlled by Gordon Wu.67 The 
takeover was seen by YTL Corp as an opportunity to create a YTL-controlled pan-
Asian power giant.68
  
YTL Corp’s power-generation business involves a 51 per cent stake in YTL-
CPI Power Ltd, which in turn owns a 60 per cent stake in a joint-venture company, 
Nanchang Zhongli Power Co Ltd, formed in China by the state; the other members of 
the joint-venture are Jiangxi Provincial Power Electric Corp and Jiangxi Provincial 
Investment Corp, also state-owned enterprises.69
  
By working with enterprises owned by the Chinese state in the power 
generation sector, YTL Corp group has probably facilitated its entry into China. 
Yeoh’s relationship with other ethnic Chinese in this sector can, however, be 
characterised as one that is adversarial in nature, seen particularly in YTL Corp’s 
attempted takeover of a firm in this sector owned by Wu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 7 23
Conclusion 
 
The limited networking among Malaysian Chinese businesses and their 
relatively poor returns from investments in China raise questions about the argument 
that the mainland is an important avenue through which Chinese enterprises around 
the world can develop new mutually beneficial ventures. These case studies raise 
questions about the application of the concept of transnationalism in the development 
of Chinese-owned firms. The basis on which the concept of transnationalism rests is 
the idea that there exists a pan-ethnic unity among ethnic Chinese in different 
countries that would enable this community to emerge as a new economic force in 
Asia as well as globally. However, the case studies reveal that transnational networks 
do not influence the way ethnic groups do business with co-ethnics in other countries. 
This study of Malaysian Chinese investments in China provides little evidence to 
support the argument that co-ethnics, even those from a minority community in a 
country, work together to promote their investments.  
  
Although there has been much overlap in areas of investment by leading 
Chinese capitalists from Asia in China, there is evidence of only one interlocking 
stock ownership tie among these businessmen, involving Khoo and Kuok who have 
had a long-standing friendship. There is no other indication that Chinese investors 
from Asia forge joint-ventures with each other, nor is there any evidence of 
interlocking stock ownership and directorate ties among these businessmen. This 
overlap in areas of investment in China by Chinese business people from Malaysia 
appears to have generated competition, rather than cooperation, between them. This 
competition also exists because most Chinese owners of companies are loath to merge 
with other firms, for to do so would mean sharing control of the enlarged enterprise. 
  
There are two major conclusions that can be reached based on this study. First, 
an evident dynamism prevails within ethnic Chinese-owned enterprises, a dynamism 
that has been attributed to intra-ethnic business cooperation. This study has, however, 
found more evidence of competition that cooperation among Chinese-owned 
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enterprises. In fact, the level of competition between ethnic Chinese-owned firms was 
significantly high, especially when competing for limited resources like control of the 
banks in Hong Kong or the manufacturing of consumer products. It is this competition 
that best explains the growth of firms owned by ethnic Chinese investing in China.  
  
The second major conclusion about Chinese-owned firms is that there is much 
evidence of inter-ethnic corporate ties. Partnerships have been forged with foreign 
firms, like Quek’s cooperation with the American firm AAF-McQuay and Yeoh’s ties 
with Siemens. These partnerships are probably not sustainable in the long-run, a trend 
that is, however, quite common in business practices.70 YTL Corp presently has no 
links with Seimens while Quek’s group eventually bought over its American partner. 
 
This would suggest that the issue of common ethnic identity is of little 
importance in transnational business transactions undertaken by ethnic Chinese from 
Asia.  Ethnicity is a political construct that has been used to justify state policies and 
endeavours (in a national perspective) and to promote or enhance economic pursuits 
(in an international perspective). At both levels, however, there is little evidence that 
common ethnicity promotes economic pursuits as well as helps unify a community. 
The case studies suggest that though individual businessmen could tap into or use 
these political constructs when it suits their business interests since some state leaders 
promote this idea of greater cross-border intra-ethnic business cooperation, there is 
little indication that their ethnic identity has served as an important tool to facilitate 
business deals. The fact that there is little business cooperation among Malaysian 
Chinese businessmen in China is not surprising given that even within Malaysia, 
where these businessmen face much discrimination from the state, they have found 
little benefit from promoting close intra-ethnic business collaboration.71 There is also 
no evidence that in Malaysia the promotion of a common ethnic identity is of any 
importance to leading Chinese businessmen in the development of their enterprise.  
  
The case studies thus challenge the argument that shared identities typify a 
universal form of Chinese capital or determine ethnic Chinese business life in 
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Southeast Asia. In Chinese communities that have settled and matured, identity and 
ethnicity are social constructs that entrepreneurs, community organisations and 
governments can manipulate in rational pursuit of their own interests. Economic ties 
to China are encouraged by governments and are not necessarily a product of 
identifications. When Chinese use such ties, they are responding to business 
opportunities rather than acting out primordial sentiments. This creative manipulation 
of ethnic symbols is quite different from Chinese business as transnational theorists 
understand it, as part of a set of values at the heart of Chinese identity everywhere. 
  
The major findings in this study bring into question the validity of the concept 
of “intra-ethnic business networks” and the notion of a distinct type of “Chinese 
capitalism”. This suggests that the concept of transnationalism not only provides little 
insight into the diversity in the forms of corporate development of Chinese business 
groups when they cross-borders, it presents a false idea, i.e. that ethnicity, based on 
common cultural formulations, functions as an important unifying factor. The extent 
of intra-ethnic cooperation among Chinese entrepreneurs is not as significant as the 
concept suggests and the potential influence of Chinese capital coalescing and 
emerging as a major force in the global economy due to the networks consolidated by 
their common ethnicity is untrue. What is clear is that the role of the state looms large 
in all discussions on migration, enterprise development and integration and is seen as 
a key factor in determining how societies and capital evolve within and outside a 
country. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Kao (1993).  
2 Kotkin (1993). 
3 Hamilton (1996). 
4 Redding (1990). 
5 The term Bumiputera means “sons of the soil”. The term is used in reference 
primarily to the Malays, though it also involves other indigenous communities.  
6 New Straits Times 30 May 2004. 
7 See, for example, East Asian Analytical Unit (1995) and Weidenbaum and Hughes 
(1996). 
9 Guarnizo and Smith (1999: 4).  
10 See, for example, Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999). 
12 Vertovec (1999: 447). 
13 See, for example, Kotkin (1993); Hamilton (1996); Lever-Tracy, Ip and Tracy 
(1996). 
14 Redding (1990), Whitley (1992) and Hamilton (1996). 
15 Basch, Schiller and Blanc (1995). 
16 Basch, Schiller and Blanc (1995: 7). 
17 Miyoshi (1993). 
18 Miyoshi (1993). 
19 Castells (1993). 
20 Gereffi (1994). 
21 Castells (1993: 177-90). 
22 Another prominent volume that advanced similar ideas, though not from the 
perspective of transnational theory, is Lever-Tracy, Ip and Tracy’s The Chinese 
Diaspora and Mainland China: An Emerging Economic Synergy. 
23 Ong and Nonini (1997: 11). 
24 Ong and Nonini (1997: 21). 
25 Ong and Nonini (1997: 323-332). 
26 Ong and Nonini (1997: 323). 
27 Ong and Nonini (1997: 323). 
28 Ong and Nonini (1997: 325). 
29 Redding (1990); Hamilton (1996). 
29 See, for example, Waldinger, et al. (1990), Waldinger (1996), Light (1972) and 
Light and Gold (2000). 
30 See, for example, Wong (1985); Redding (1990); Whitley (1992); Castells (1993); 
Fukuyama (1995); and Whyte (1996). Family firms are not unique to the Chinese. In 
Europe, between 75 and 90 per cent of firms are reputed to be family enterprises. One 
in eight companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange are family firms. 
According the magazine, Fortune, in 1993, nearly a third of the top 500 US firms 
were family-owned. 
31 Chandler (1962); Penrose (1980). 
32 Redding (1996). 
33 See, for example, Hamilton (1996). 
34 Yeung and Olds (2000). 
35 Lever-Tracy and Tracy (1999). 
36 Lever-Tracy and Tracy (1999: 5). 
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37 See, for example, Gomez (1999), Gomez and Hsiao (2001) and Schak (2000). 
38 See Gomez and Hsiao (2004) for an in-depth analysis of this argument. 
39 Benton and Gomez (2001). 
40 For a comparative study of the Chinese in the UK, Australia and Southeast Asia, 
see Gomez and Benton (2004). For a historical profile of the Chinese in the US, see 
Zia (2000) and Chang (2003). 
42 See Ang (2001) for a cogent analysis of the complexity of the issue of “Chinese 
identity” for migrants’ offspring. For a similar perspective of the new generation of 
Chinese in the US, see Louie (2004). 
45 See The Edge 10 March 2003. 
46 The Edge 10 March 2003. 
47 See www.fashion-asia.com/article.cfm?id=33
48 New Straits Times 2 June 2004. 
49 See The Edge 29 June 2004. 
50 See The Star 30 June 2004. 
51 Bernama 17 May 2004. 
52 New Straits Times14 September 1993. 
53 New Straits Times 5-6 October 1991. 
54 New Straits Times 14 September 1993. 
55 Business Times 14 September 1993. 
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